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Abstract – This paper presents a new recovery scheme for dealing 
with short-to-long duration transient faults in combinational 
logic. The new scheme takes earlier into account results of 
concurrent error detection (CED) mechanisms, and then it is able 
to perform shorter recovery latencies than existing similar 
strategy. The proposed scheme also requires less memory 
resources to save input contexts of combinational logic blocks. In 
addition, this work also proposes a taxonomy of CED techniques. 
It allows pointing out which are the necessary recovery resources 
as well as identifying which are the types of CED mechanisms 
that can be used with the new recovery scheme of this paper. The 
effectiveness of the proposed scheme was evaluated through 
electrical-level simulations. For all short-to-long duration 
transient-fault injections, it was never slower than state-of-art 
similar strategy, and indeed its recovery latency was faster for 
34% of the simulated faulty scenarios. 
Keywords – transient faults; soft errors; concurrent error 
detection; and recovery schemes 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Higher resilience is expected from an increasing number of 
integrated systems while, in the same time, ultra-deep 
submicron technologies make these systems prone to 
misbehaviors induced by the natural aging processes or the 
environment (radiations from cosmic origin or every day 
material). In addition to these natural phenomena, malicious 
fault-based attacks can be used for leading secure systems to 
misbehavior, bypassing security mechanisms or providing 
information on confidential data [1][2]. For both these 
environmental or malicious phenomena many applications 
require fast recovery. 
Until the early 2000’s, researches on transient faults and soft 
errors focused essentially on memory elements, which were 
considered the system’s most vulnerable circuits. Many 
concurrent error detection and/or correction mechanisms were 
proposed to mitigate soft errors induced by transient faults in 
memory cells. In the last decade, however, more sensitive 
deep-submicron technologies as well as the increasing demand 
in terms of digital security have also pushed for the 
development of countermeasures against transient faults in 
combinational parts of the circuits. These faults indeed can 
propagate up to storage elements and thus cause soft errors as 
well. On the other hand, if the transient fault does not induce 
any error due to an electrical, logical or latching-window 
masking effect, its detection is crucial all the same in secure 
applications since the fault itself reveals an attempt of attack. 
In addition, some transient fault phenomena considered as 
short in the past (much less than one clock cycle) can be now 
considered as long duration transient faults (reaching the clock 
period) due to the possibility of higher operating frequencies 
in recent ultra-deep-submicron technology-based circuits 
[3][4]. In fact, the effects of long-duration transient faults have 
clearly a much higher probability of not being masked, and so 
they also stand a greater chance of producing system failures. 
In addition, we may expect that maliciously induced transients 
could be better monitored whether they last several clock 
cycles. This emerging issue on long-duration transients 
introduces therefore supplementary difficulties to design 
optimized protections for the circuits. 
The current trend in solutions to cope with transient-fault 
effects is applying protection techniques at different 
abstraction levels of the design [3][4][5][6]. The idea is thus to 
prevent the use of costly fault-tolerance mechanisms like the 
tripe modular redundancy, taking advantage of cheaper 
mitigation techniques that ensure satisfactory soft-error 
coverage for the system’s most recurrent operations. This 
modern strategy is exemplified through recovery schemes 
based on concurrent error detection (CED). 
CED mechanisms designed at transistor or gate level 
guarantee an early detection, as soon as the faults happens, 
preventing more critical failure scenarios such as the induction 
and propagation of multiple errors to other clock cycles, 
stages, or parts of the system. In case of misbehavior, an error 
flag is generated and the scheme can activate recovery 
mechanisms already implemented in modern systems for 
dealing with branch misprediction [4][6]. After the transient 
fault disappearing, earlier faulty operation is thus repeated and 
the system returns to perform its normal computational 
sequence. 
This work proposes a new recovery scheme based on CED 
that can be also used to improve already existing solutions. 
More precisely, the contributions of this paper are: 
• Section II presents a new taxonomy of CED techniques 
that allows understanding the requirements for 
implementing their associated recovery schemes 
against short-to-long duration transient faults as well as 
evaluating qualitatively their costs and efficiencies; 
• Section III discusses recovery schemes at micro-
architectural level in function of the CED types defined 
in section II. Furthermore, we show a transient-fault 
scenario that proves for existing recovery schemes the 
exigency of saving two input contexts of logic blocks; 
• Section IV presents the new recovery scheme and, 
unlike our work in [7], its generic applicability for any 
CED technique classified in II as asynchronous due to 
its transient result in function of the fault behavior; 
• Section V evaluates the effectiveness of our scheme 
and compares it with another existing similar strategy. 
We show the benefits of the new recovery scheme 
based on experimental results issued from transient-
fault injection simulations. 
II. TYPES OF CED TECHNIQUES 
In the following, CED (Concurrent Error Detection) is a 
misuse of language because we consider error detection and 
fault detection schemes as well. As mentioned before, 
transient faults do not necessarily produce a soft error; 
however detection of masked transient faults is also of 
importance for secure applications. 
Classic CED solutions to face transient-fault effects are 
adding spatial, information, or time redundancy to the circuit. 
These three approaches can be implemented at different 
abstraction levels of the design. Fig. 1 presents basic example 
of such techniques at micro-architectural level. They 
essentially compare two redundant results of which at least 
one must be safe to permit the detection of errors. If for 
instance one result fails, the comparison provides an error flag. 
Furthermore, Fig. 1 also illustrates another type of CED that is 
based on built-in current sensors (BICS). BICS are connected 
either to Vdd and Gnd (VGBICS in [8]) or to Bulks of 
transistors (BBICS in [9]) in order to detect anomalous 
transient currents that can become (or not) soft errors. BICS-
based schemes therefore are able to generate an error flag in 
case of occurrence of transient faults within a range defined by 
the calibration of the BICS. 
Fig.2 generalizes the components of a CED with recovery to 
protect a target circuit. The CED circuitry is responsible to 
deliver an error flag if a transient misbehaviour is detected 
(i.e. a transient fault in the combinational logic of the target 
circuit or a soft error in a storage element). However, as such 
an error flag can have behaviours as transient and 
asynchronous as the transient fault that induces it, mechanisms 
for sampling this CED’s result have to be implemented. These 
sampling mechanisms ensure the error flags in a steady state 
enough time to activate correctly the recovery procedure. 
If we come back to the columns of Fig. 1, we can even 
classify the CED techniques into two types according to the 
features of their error flags: 
• Synchronous CED schemes: classic CED approaches 
that compare their redundant parts after the data 
register (e.g. [10][11][12][13][14]). Hence, they 
inherently guarantee their results in steady conditions 
during the cycle following the cycle on which the 
transient fault appears. The error flag is generated 
already in synchronization with the system since the 
mechanisms for sampling such a CED’s result are 
indeed parts of the CED scheme. Therefore, there is no 
need for registering this result if its value is directly 
used for starting the recovery procedure during the 
cycle following the first faulty cycle. On the other 
hand, only transient faults that reach data registers 
(causing soft errors) are detected in this case. As 
discussed before, it is correct for applications in which 
the recovery must be launch only in case of soft errors, 
but this is not sufficient when transient faults must be 
detected even if they do not induce any error. 
Synchronous CED schemes can be very expensive 
since they require the storage of all redundant data bits 




• Asynchronous CED schemes: CED techniques that 
generate asynchronously their error flags in function of 
the transient-fault features (e.g. [4][6][8][9][16][17] 
[18][19][20]). Hence, asynchronous CED schemes 
must include another extra 1-bit register dedicated only 
to sample their error flags, and so ensuring results at 
steady state during the necessary time for starting the 
recovery procedures. Conversely to synchronous CED 
schemes, there is no need to register the redundant data 
bits but only the flag, and thus these solutions are less 
expensive [15]. 
Figure 1. Examples of synchronous and asynchronous CED schemes 
Figure 2. A target circuit protected by using CED with recovery 
III. RECOVERY SCHEMES FOR DEALING WITH SHORT AND 
LONG-DURATION TRANSIENT FAULTS IN LOGIC 
CED techniques dedicated to identify transient-fault effects 
require recovery schemes in order to correct soft errors. The 
recovery machine acts in function of the CED’s result to thus 
in fault-free conditions repeat the affected cycles whether an 
error flag is generated. 
The recovery scheme, therefore, initially works to save 
fault-free input status of the target circuit, such as input values 
of logic blocks. Then, in case of an error flag, the system is 
able to later reload such good input values (after the transient 
fault vanishing), and so recomputing the first cycle at which the 
fault has affected the logic block’s operations. 
We highlight that there is a latency of extra clock cycles 
only if a transient fault is detected, and thus the target circuit 
normally operates without penalty in fault-free scenarios. 
About the area overheads added by recovery schemes we 
remind that they can be minimal whether the target circuit’s 
architecture has already a machine to repeat operations in 
branch-misprediction situations. In addition, microprocessor-
based systems can take advantage of their instruction/data 
memory resources in order to save the input context of logic 
blocks. 
Fig. 3, 4, and 5 illustrate a system compounded of a register 
IN, a register OUT, and a logic block that is protected by three 
different recovery schemes for dealing with short and long 
duration transient faults. The other grey blocks (i.e. except 
CED schemes, Redundant, Fault and Recovery Registers, and 
Reset multiplexer) are resources that might be already present 
in certain modern architectures to recompute previous 
operations, and so they can be reused in conjunction with CED 
schemes to mitigate transient faults. Note in Fig. 3, 4, and 5 
that the communications between the CED blocks and the 
recovery circuits are slightly different. More precisely, the type 
of CED scheme (Synchronous or Asynchronous, as section II 
defines) and the strategy for sampling its results (e.g. by using 
a Flip-Flop or a Latch) determine the recovery efficiency and 
which minimum memory resources are necessary to properly 
save input contexts of logic blocks during the fault-free cycles 
that precede the first faulty cycle “First_Faulty_Cycle”. 
The costly synchronous CED techniques discussed in II 
require at least a recovery scheme similar to Fig. 3’s 
illustration. This classic machine saves the logic block’s inputs 
during each clock’s low phase by using a memory that, in this 
example, is represented by K latches, and we call it in this 
paper as a backup file. Then, when the CED scheme indicates 
an error flag in the cycle posterior to “First_Faulty_Cycle”, the 
machine is able to restore the saved logic block’s inputs (Fig. 
3’s “saved_logic_inputs”) of one cycle ago the instant at which 
the error flag is set (i.e. the logic block’s inputs of 
“First_Faulty_Cycle”). This process of restoring and 
recomputing is done in the first following fault-free cycle 
“Repeated_Cycle” on which the transient fault has already 
vanished. 
Asynchronous CED techniques that use a flip-flop for 
sampling its results demand a recovery scheme like the 
schematic in Fig. 4 (e.g. [6]’s Checksum-based scheme). This 
simple strategy is not so efficient to sample the CED’s results 
[15][21], and then its recovery efficiency is moderate. 
On the other hand, Asynchronous CED techniques that use 
a latch require more elaborate recovery architecture such as 
Fig. 5 shows, but they allow high recovery efficiency (e.g. [4]’s 
BBICS-based scheme). In fact, the fault register’s output from 
Fig. 5’s scheme has a steady condition but it can be achieved at 
any instant, in function of the moment at which the transient 
fault happens as well as the duration it takes. This fault 
register’s output is, therefore, an asynchronous signal that must 
be synchronized in order to be correctly dealt by the recovery 
scheme. Hence, another flip-flop, illustrated in Fig. 5 as 
recovery register, is mandatory to prevent metastability 
problems. This flip-flop also ensures enough time to reset the 
fault register before the recomputation as well as it allows to 
deal with cases in which the response time “RT” of the 
asynchronous CED is longer than the clock’s high pulse width. 
Note that if the fault register is a latch, we define RT as the 
delay between the beginning of the transient fault and the fault 
register’s output. On the other hand, if the fault register is a 
flip-flop, it already makes the synchronization with the 
recovery scheme, and then RT is defined as the delay between 
the beginning of the transient fault and the Asynchronous CED 
scheme’s output.   
 
 
Figure 3. Classic recovery scheme for Synchronous CED techniques 
Figure 4. Recovery scheme based on a flip-flop to sample results of 
asynchronous CED mechanisms 
 Both types of machine in Fig. 4 and 5 save logic block’s 
inputs of two clock cycles by using two backup files with K 
latches each one. Thereby, if CED scheme indicates an error 
flag, the recovery circuit is able to restore in “Repeated_Cycle” 
the saved logic block’s inputs (Fig. 4 and Fig 5.’s 
“saved_logic_inputs”) of two cycles ago the instant at which 
the error flag is identified and registered at 
“signal_keeping_previous”. Observe in Fig. 4 and 5 that this 
signal is used to keep in the backup files the logic block’s 
inputs of the previous cycles. 
We notice in this paper that recovery strategies such as Fig. 
4 and Fig. 5’s schemes necessarily need at least two backup 
files with K latches to save logic block’s inputs of two clock 
cycles. In fact, as Fig. 6 highlights, there are chances of 
transient faults “TF” starting in cycle 1 not to raise 
“signal_keeping_previous” in cycle 2, and then the logic 
block’s inputs saved in file 1 during cycle 1 must be transferred 
to file 2 during cycle 2 in order to be available in cycle 3. 
Furthermore, if the response time “RT” is greater than the 
clock period “T” (e.g. [4]’s BBICS calibrated with slower RT), 
more than two files are required. Therefore, the slower the RT 
the greater can be the number of required files. 
 
Let us now in Fig. 7 take another example like Fig. 6’s case 
but with a transient fault of longer duration “TF1”. It starts on a 
“node_x” of Fig. 5’s logic block during cycle 1. The 
asynchronous CED’s scheme thus raises in cycle 2 an error flag 
at signal “Flag” after a maximum response time “RT” equals to 
50 % of the circuit’s clock period “T”. However, this error flag 
is only registered at recovery register during cycle 3. Then, as 
“signal_keeping_previous” achieves steady logical level “1” in 
cycle 3, logic block’s inputs from cycle 1 (which are kept at 
“saved_logic_inputs”) are restored in register IN at the 
beginning of cycle 4. Nevertheless, as TF1 spans up to cycle 3, 
the asynchronous CED’s scheme raises again an error flag that 
keeps the recovery register at “1” during cycle 4. Thus, logic 
block’s inputs from cycle 1 are restored once more in register 
IN but now at beginning of cycle 5 in order to recompute such 
an operation without faults. TF1, therefore, penalizes the 
system with a recovery latency of four extra cycles by using 
Fig. 5’s scheme. 
Furthermore, Fig. 7 also shows a fault “TF2” that makes 
the recovery register’s flip-flop metastable. Then, 
“signal_keeping_previous” results in an unknown value that 
may be, for instance, “0”, and so TF2 would penalize the 
system with a latency of three extra cycles instead of two 
whether the resultant value was “1”. 
 
Figure 5. Recovery scheme based on a latch and a flip-flop to sample 
results of asynchronous CED mechanisms 
Figure 6. Transient fault’s case that proves the exigency of at least two 
backup files for Fig. 4 and Fig. 5’s recovery schemes 
Figure 7. Functional behavior of Fig. 5’s recovery scheme to cope with transient faults “TF1” and “TF2” 
IV. A NEW RECOVERY SCHEMES FOR DEALING WITH 
SHORT AND LONG-DURATION TRANSIENT FAULTS IN LOGIC 
We propose in this section a considerable improvement of 
Fig. 5’s scheme discussed in III. Our improved scheme, which 
is illustrated in Fig. 8, requires a smaller number of memory 
resources. In fact, only a backup file is necessary since our 
approach need to save the logic block’s inputs of just one cycle 
ago the instant at which an error flag is identified and 
registered at recovery register. This optimization is made by 
using a latch as recovery register instead of a flip-flop. It 
allows starting to sample the signal “Flag” at clock’s falling 
edge, and so the scheme can deal earlier with error flags 
coming from asynchronous CED schemes. 
 
Fig. 9 gives further details about our recovery scheme by 
showing the mitigation of the transient faults “TF1”, “TF3”, 
“TF2”, and “TF4”. Note that the same faults “TF1” and “TF2” 
analyzed in Fig. 7 for Fig. 5’s scheme are also discussed for 
our approach. 
 Let us firstly analyze TF1 and TF2. Unlike the reactions of 
Fig. 7’s “signal_keeping_previous”, this signal in Fig. 9 raises 
earlier during cycle 2 and cycle 8 instead of respectively cycle 
3 and cycle 9 in Fig. 7. In fact, Fig. 9’s “signal_keeping_ 
previous” gets steady logical level “1” after clock’s falling 
edge in cycle 2 and cycle 8, then logic block’s inputs of 
“First_Faulty_Cycle” are restored earlier in register IN, at the 
beginning of cycle 3 and cycle 9. As TF1 lasts until cycle 3, the 
logic block’s inputs from cycle 1 are restored again in register 
IN at the beginning of cycle 4, and so the faulty operation is 
now properly re-executed without the fault presence. 
Therefore, TF1 and TF2 penalizes the system respectively with 
three and two extra cycles instead of four and three taken by 
using Fig. 5’s scheme. Our improved scheme shows thus 
requiring smaller latencies to complete the recovery due to 
short or long-duration transient faults. In fact, our approach 
advances the recomputation by anticipating the identification of 
error flags at the clock’s falling edge instead of the rising edge 
used by Fig. 5’s scheme. 
Note however that there are two simple design constraints 
which are modified to ensure the anticipation of the 
recomputation as well as the use of only one backup file to 
save previous logic block’s inputs. 
In order to explain the first constraint, let us initially take 
Fig. 9’s limit fault scenario in cycle 5. TF3 starts on the border 
on which cycle 4 leaves of being perturbed, and so from such 
an instant, which is defined as hold time “THold” after clock’s 
rising edge, cycle 4 is not necessary to be recomputed later. 
Clock’s high Pulse Width “hPW” has to be thus ensured 
sufficiently longer than RT for clock’s falling edge sampling 
correctly this last TF3-induced error flag that requires logic 
block’s inputs from cycle 4. If it is accomplished, all transient 
faults started from the beginning of cycle 4 (after hold time 
“THold”) until the instant of the TF3’s startup have their 
resultant error flags certainly sampled in cycle 5, and so only 
the logic block’s inputs from cycle 4 has to be saved. 
Equation (1) below defines this first constraint by using a 
TMarginFall as additional time margin for variations in clock’s 
falling edge operations (jitter and skew), and manufacturing 
and environmental variabilities: 
 inFallMFileupSetgINHold TTTRThPW arg1_Re_ +++> −   (1) 
The second design constraint is related to the low Pulse 
Width “lPW” that complements hPW to make a clock period 
“T”. In fact, by taking similar TF3 scenario but with TF 
starting a little after, lPW must last enough time in cycle 5 to 
ensure the worst case (after clock’s edge falling) when an error 
flag at signal “Flag” causes metastability in recovery register’s 
latch and “signal_keeping_previous” stabilizes at logical level 
“1”. In this situation, the condition below in (2) must be 
respected in order to the scheme works properly to recompute 
in cycle 6 the logic block’s inputs from cycle 4. TMarginRise is 
similar to TMarginFall but for clock’s rising edge, DMux2x1, and 
DLatch are respectively the delays of the multiplexer at the 
register IN’s inputs, and of the recovery register’s latch.  
By using the fact that T = hPW + lPW, (2) results in (3). 
And taking (1) and (3), we have (4). Note that RT and T are 
adjustable whether equations (5) (derived from (1)) and (6) are 
respected. DLogic is the Logic Block’s longest delay. 
( ) gINupSetinRiseMxMuxLatchinFallMgerHold TTDDTThPWTlPW Re_arg12argRecovRe_ −+++++>−=
 
 (2) 
( )gINupSetinRiseMxMuxLatchinFallMgerHold TTDDTTThPW Re_arg12argRecovRe_ −+++++−<
 
(3) 
( )gINupSetinRiseMxMuxLatchinFallMgeryHoldinFallMFileupSetgINHold TTDDTTThPWTTTRT Re_arg12argRecovRe_arg1_Re_ −− +++++−<<+++  (4) ( )inFallMFileupSetgINHold TTThPWRT arg1_Re_ ++−< −   (5) 
gOUTupSetinRiseMLogicgINHold TTDTT Re_argRe_ −+++>   (6) 
Figure 8. Our new recovery scheme based on a two latches to sample 
results of asynchronous CED mechanisms 
 V. EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS COMPARING RECOVERY 
SCHEMES 
In this section we present some experimental results that 
show the effectiveness of our proposed approach. We compare 
the recovery latency required for the schemes presented in Fig. 
5 and Fig. 8 (our proposed solution). Fig. 3 and Fig. 4’s 
schemes are not considered because the first one is very costly 
in terms of area and power consumption while Fig. 4’s 
approach is not so effective in identifying many transient-fault 
scenarios and requires at least two backup files (see 
discussions in sections II and III). Furthermore, in theory these 
schemes in Fig. 3 and Fig. 4 have higher recovery latencies or, 
at the best, equivalent since they sample the error flags by 
using the same clock’s edge used by register IN and OUT.   
Experimental results were obtained using hspice simulation 
of circuits with the recovery schemes and of the injected 
single transient fault. The asynchronous CED scheme and the 
fault register’s latch from Fig. 5 and Fig. 8 were emulated 
such as the behavior of BBICS. The following parameters 
were considered: 
• The circuits were designed using a 65-nm standard-cell 
library (ST CORE65LPSVT), Vdd 1.2V, and nominal 
conditions; 
• The clock period is 1ns, 50 % duty cycle; 
• The transient fault was simulated by using a double-
exponential current source. Then, transient pulses with 
several durations (50ps, 250ps, 500ps, 750ps, and 1ns) 
were parameterized in such a way that the voltage 
amplitude achieves Vdd. It prevents the electrical 
masking effects of the transient faults. In fact, as the 
goal is to analyze the efficiency of the recovery 
mechanisms and not of the CED techniques, we were 
not interested in any type of transient-fault masking 
effect; 
• Considered RT (asynchronous CED’s response time 
defined in III) are 200ps, 250ps, 300ps, and 400ps; 
• Initial instant of injection were simulated from 0 to 
1000 ps of “First_Faulty_Cycle”. We have therefore 
supposed a range of different logic block’s nodes on 
which single transient faults are injected and 
propagated up to make a soft error in register OUT. 
Logical and latching-window masking effects of the 
transient faults are thus not taken into account. As a 
step of 1ps is used, 1000 simulations were performed 
for each value of RT and fault duration; 
• Recovery latency is expressed in number of clock 
cycles required for the scheme to recompute the logic 
block’s inputs of “First_Faulty_Cycle”. 
For each RT values and transient fault durations, we have 
counted how many injections (over 1000) were recovered in 1, 
2, 3, and 4 clock cycles. Results of all simulations are 
summarized in Fig. 10. As it can be seen, our proposed 
scheme allows recovering from short and long transient faults 
in less clock cycles than the other solution. For instance, for 
RT 400ps and fault duration 1000ps, our Fig. 8’s approach has 
a recovery latency of 4 cycles in 21% of the injected faults and 
of 3 cycles in the remainder 79%, while Fig. 5’s scheme 
requires 4 cycles in 73% of the injected faults and of 3 cycles 
in 27% of the scenarios. 
Finally, taking into account all transient fault durations for 
RT 200ps, 250ps, 300ps, and 400ps, the circuit with our 
scheme returned to its normal operation one cycle earlier 
respectively in 31%, 33%, 35%, and 37% of the injected 
transient-fault scenarios. Note therefore that the slower the RT 
the better is our solution. Evidently, in the remainder of the 
scenarios both schemes have the same recovery latency.  
Figure 9. Functional behavior of our new recovery scheme to cope with transient faults “TF1”, “TF3”, “TF2”, and “TF4” 
 VI. FINAL CONCLUSIONS 
In this paper we have proposed the classification of the 
CED techniques into synchronous and asynchronous in order to 
identify which are the necessary recovery resources. In 
addition, we have proposed a new recovery scheme based on 
asynchronous CED schemes for dealing with short-to-long 
transient faults. Our approach uses the clock’s falling edges (in 
case of data registers use clock’s rising edges) for starting to 
sample error flags from transient faults. It allows reducing the 
recovery latency by one cycle. Moreover, the new recovery 
scheme also permits to use only a backup file to save input 
contexts of logic blocks. Our solution therefore requires much 
smaller recovery resources and lower latency than existing 
similar strategy. 
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Figure 10. Distribution of recovery latencies (1, 2, 3, or 4 clock cycles) for Fig. 8 and Fig. 5’s recovery schemes in function of the asynchronous CED’s 
response time “RT” (200ps, 250ps, 300ps, and 400ps) and the transient fault duration (50ps, 250ps, 500ps, 750ps, and 1ns). For instance, let us take RT 
200ps and fault duration 50ps, our Fig. 8’s approach has a recovery latency of 1 cycle in 26% of the injected faults and of 2 cycles in the remainder 
74%, while Fig. 5’s scheme requires 3 cycles in 27% of the injected faults and of 2 cycles in 73% of the scenarios. 
